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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANTITRUST-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Clayton Act
Statute of Limitations Tolled on Treble Damage
Suits Against Non-Government Defendant
Co-Conspirators-Michigan v.
Morton Salt Co.*
Plaintiffs,1 several states and smaller governmental units, filed
related antitrust treble damage claims2 against ten rock salt companies that had allegedly conspired to fix prices.3 These private actions were instituted subsequent to civil and criminal antitrust proceedings brought by the federal government in which four of the
ten companies had been named as defendants4 and five designated as
co-conspirators but not prosecuted.5 Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act
• 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), affd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois,
377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967) [the district court litigation will hereinafter be cited as
principal case.] The only issue decided on appeal was the application of the tolling
provision to non-government defendants.
1. Plaintiffs in the consolidated actions included the states of Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and "Wisconsin as well as various governmental
units within these states.
2. These treble damage claims were brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act which
provides:
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
38 Stat. 131 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
3. Defendants were American Salt Co. (American), Barton Salt Co. (Barton), Carey
Salt Co. (Carey), Cargill, Inc. (Cargill), Cargo Carriers, Inc. (Cargo), Cutler-Magner Co.
(Cutler-Magner), Diamond Crystal Salt Co. (Diamond), Hardy Salt Co. (Hardy), International Salt Co. (International), and Morton Salt Co. (Morton).
4. On June 28, 1961 an indictment was returned in the District of Minnesota
against Morton, International, Diamond, and Carey alleging that they had conspired to
fix the prices of rock salt in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v.
Morton Salt Co., Criminal No. 4-61, Cr. No. 65, D. Minn.-On July 11, 1961 the government instituted a corresponding civil proceeding in which it sought injunctive
relief against the same alleged violations by the same defendants. United States v.
Morton Salt Co., Civil No. 4-61, Civ. No. 162, D. Minn. However, prior to trial of the
criminal action, defendant Carey pleaded nolo contendere, and entered a consent decree in the civil action on March 26, 1962. The civil suit against the remaining three
defendants was then suspended pending the outcome of the parallel criminal action.
On June 7, 1962 the defendants obtained a verdict in their favor. The civil trial
then was reconvened, and on September 18, 1963 defendant International submitted
a stipulation for a consent decree. This decree was signed and entered on November
4, 1963 and became operative on January 5, 1964. Pursuant to agreement, the civil
case against Morton and Diamond was tried on the record established in the criminal
action, supplemented by interrogatories and answers. An amended final judgment
adverse to Morton and Diamond was entered on February 19, 1965, and this decision
was subsequently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on October 25, 1965.
Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 44 (1965).
5. Defendants mentioned as co-conspirators in the government litigation but not
named as defendants were American, Barton, Hardy, Cutler-Magner, and Cargill.
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provides that when such actions are brought by the government,
"the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private
right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part
on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . . . ." 6
Plaintiffs filed their claims within one year of the termination of
the last of the government suits but ·more than four years after the
occurrence of the alleged violations. The six companies not prosecuted by the government claimed that the tolling provisions of section 5(b) applied only to former government defendants, and, consequently, that the private actions against them were barred by the
Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations.7 The United States
Cargo was neither a named defendant nor a designated co-conspirator in the government litigation.
6. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
7. These defendants relied on numerous cases limiting the application of § 5(b) to
government defendants. E.g., cases cited in note 17 infra. The tolling provision of
§ 5(b) of the Clayton Act provides as follows:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 15(a) of this title, the running of the statute of
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall
be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided,
however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitatio'ls in respect of a
cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is suspended hereunder, any
action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced
either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of
action accrued.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
The four companies that were former government defendants argued that the
statute of limitations barred some of the plaintiffs' claims against them, notwithstanding the fact that the statute had been tolled as to these companies. Defendant Carey
maintained that the government criminal and civil actions against it were terminated
on March 26, 1962 when a plea of nolo contendere was entered in the criminal action
and a consent decree entered in the civil action. It argued that therefore, since the
earliest filing of a private damage claim against it occurred on December 30, 1964, this
and all subsequent claims were barred both by the four-year statute of limitations provided by § 4B (the causes of action having arisen more than four years prior to the
filing of the damage claims) and by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to
damage claims based on violations prosecuted in earlier government litigation as provided for in § 5(b) (nearly two years having elapsed between the termination of government proceedings against defendant Carey and the filing of damage claims).
Defendant International contended that, with respect to it, the government proceedings terminated with its consent decree in the civil suit, and, because only the action
brought by the State of Illinois was commenced within the following twelve-month
period, Illinois alone was accorded any benefit by § 5(b). Finally, defendants Diamond
and Morton claimed that all actions filed after June 7, 1963 were barred by the one-year
statute of limitations since § 5(b) provides for tolling during only one government
proceeding. Thus they argued that after termination of the criminal proceeding on
June 7, 1962 the statute of limitations commenced to run notwithstanding the fact
that the civil suit did not terminate until October 25, 1965. Brief of Diamond Crystal
Salt Co. and Morton Salt Co., pp. 5-6, principal case.
In response to these assertions, plaintiffs made three arguments: (I) that the government litigation had caused the tolling of the statute of limitations as to all of the
private defendants, whether or not they had been parties to the government suit;
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District Court for Minnesota held that the Clayton Act's statute of
limitations can be tolled as to parties not prosecuted by the government, and that such tolling commences when the government institutes a related criminal or civil proceeding for violation of the
antitrust laws against any alleged co-conspirator and terminates
when the related government litigation is concluded. Thus, the court
held that none of the plaintiffs' actions was time-barred. 8
In so holding, the court in the principal case failed to distinguish
benveen nvo related, but nonetheless distinct, criteria which determine the application of section 5(b): "identity of matters" and
"party scope." "Identity of matters" refers to the degree of similarity
that is required between a private plaintiff's treble damage claim and
prior government litigation before the plaintiff can properly claim
that the government action tolled the statute of limitations. Section
5(b) requires that the private right of action must be based "in
whole or in part on any matter complained of" in the government
proceeding. 0 "Party scope" is concerned with the identification of
those parties against whom the statute has been tolled. The court in
the principal case reasoned that since no language in section 5(b)
specifically relates to "party scope," the statute of limitations may be
tolled with regard to every private right of action that satisfies the
"identity of matters" requirement. Thus, the court in effect rendered nugatory the question of "party scope." This interpretation
of section 5(b) is, however, unwarranted.
The court in interpreting the "party scope" limitation based its
decision in part on language in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 10 and Leh v. General Petroleum Corp. 11 In Minnesota Mining a private plaintiff instituted
antitrust actions against both Minnesota Mining and Essex, although
Essex had not been a defendant in the prior government litigation.
(2) that such tolling began with the commencement of the first grand jury proceeding
against any of the alleged conspirators, and terminated upon the conclusion of the
la5t of the government suits maintained against those conspirators; and (3) that plaintiffs were not precluded by the statute of limitations from proceeding against any
conspiring party, since their claims were all filed within one year of the termination of
a related government suit against one of the present defendants. In short, plaintiffs
maintained that they had complied with the statute of limitations. Brief for the State
of Michigan, p. 5, principal case.
8. On the facts before it, the court found that the running of the statute of limitations was suspended on June 28, 1961 when the first indictment based on the alleged
conspiracy was filed, and began running again on October 25, 1965 with the Supreme
Court's affirmation of the civil judgments entered against the last of the prosecuted
conspirators.
9. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), quoted in note 7 supra.
10. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
11. 382 U.S. 54 (1965). The opinion in the principal case cites the following language from the Leh decision: "[I']he private plaintiff is not required to allege that the
same means were used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by the
same defendants." Id. at 59.
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The Supreme Court held that inclusion of Essex as a private defendant had not impaired the necessary "identity of matters." Similarly, in Leh the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient identity
between the government litigation and a later treble damage claim
to toll the statute of limitations, even though the private action was
brought against only six of the eight government defendants. The
Court reasoned that, even in the absence of the remaining government defendants, there was still a substantial relation between the
substantive bases of the actions; furthermore, the policy of encouraging antitrust enforcement by private plaintiffs was felt to outweigh
the need for complete party identity.12 In both Minnesota Mining
and Leh, however, the party objecting to the tolling was a former
government defendant; 13 thus, it must be recognized that these decisions merely held that a private plaintiff could sue parties not
prosecuted by the government together with former government
defendants, and still satisfy the "identity" requirement of section 5(b).
In neither case was tolling as to the non-government defendants
("party scope") an issue before the Supreme Court.14 Furthermore,
12. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1965). The courts initially
construed the "identity of matters" clause as requiring that the private plaintiff allege
not only the same antitrust violation which the government had prosecuted, but also
that the same means were used to reach the same objectives by the same defendants
as were the subject matter of the government action. Steiner v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956). This construction was based on the
premise that since §§ 5(a) &: (b) are complementary, they must be read together. Having
made this assumption, the courts concluded that since § 5(a) limits the use of government-secured judgments in order to insure that the party against whom the decree
is used has had an opportunity to litigate fully those issues of which the decision is
dispositive, § 5(b) is impliedly restricted by the principles of collateral estoppel.
The Ninth Circuit later clarified the Steiner standard as requiring only that, with
respect to § 5(b), the private action be based in part on a matter complained of in the
government prosecution, and not that all matters complained of necessarily find a
counterpart in the government action. Twentieth Centry Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn,
328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964). Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit adopted a similar
test. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963). Although the Tenth Circuit required only a substantial
identity between the private and government suits, it expressly rejected the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that the complementary nature of §§ 5(a) &: (b) necessitates the
incorporation of a collateral estoppel limitation into the latter. The Supreme Court
settled this "incorporation" dispute by ruling that the restrictions of collateral estoppel are not implicit in the language of § 5(b), and, consequently, that its scope is not
restricted by such considerations. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
13. In Minnesota Mining the Supreme Court was presented with only that part of
the district court's ruling which involved Minnesota Mining since the lower court's
decision that the statute of limitations had not been tolled as to Essex was not appealed. In Leh the case against the non-government defendant (Olympic Oil Co.) was
dismissed prior to the ruling on defendants' statute of limitations defense. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 61 n.4 (1965).
14. Admittedly, some language in these recent Supreme Court opinions, taken out
of context, appears to support the conclusion reached in the principal case. In Leh
the Court said:
In suits of this kind, the absence of complete identity of defendants may be explained on several grounds unrelated to the question of whether the private
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the district court in Minnesota Mining had sustained the nongovernment defendant's claim that it was not subject to tolling
under section 5(b),15 and, although this issue was not appealed, the
Third Circuit indicated support for this decision in dictum.16
The court in the principal case did not view its opinion as an
independent rejection of the many prior contrary decisions which
refused to toll the statute of limitations as to non-government defendants;17 rather, it saw itself as following the precedent laid down
in Minnesota Mining and Leh which the court thought overruled the
rationale of the earlier cases.18 It assumed that the contrary decisions
were based on the incorporation into section 5(b) of the principles
of collateral estoppel expressed in section 5(a).19 Thus, the court
interpreted the Supreme Court's rejection, in Minnesota Mining
and in Leh, of this "incorporation doctrine"20 as overruling the
earlier contrary cases sub silentio. However, the court's interpretation of the earlier cases appears to be mistaken. These cases 'did
not rely on the incorporation doctrine; instead, several of these
decisions, without making any reference to the principles of collateral estoppel, either regarded the limitation of the application of
the tolling provisions to former government defendants as selfevident or rejected the argument in favor of extending section 5(b)
to non-government defendants as "a surprising theory of conclaimant's suit is based on matters of which the Government complained. • • •
[S]ome of the conspirators whose activities injured the private claimant may have
been too low in the conspiracy to be selected as named defendants or co-conspirators in the Government's necessarily broader net.
The court in the principal case read this language in light of the Supreme Court's
general mandate to maximize the benefits accruing to private claimants from government litigation. However, again it must be emphasized that the Court wrote the
quoted passage in response to a claim by a former government defendant that tolling
was not warranted as to it because the "identity of matters" requirement of § 5(b) was
not satisfied. Read in this light, the language only implies that the presence of a nongovernment defendant in a later private damage claim does not, in and of itself,
impair the requisite "identity of matters." It in no way supports a conclusion that
tolling against non-government defendants is proper.
15. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp.
507 (D.N.J. 1963).
16. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346,
360 n.15 (3d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
17. See, e.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th
Cir. 1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Charles Rubenstein Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 176 F.
Supp. 527 (D. Minn. 1959) (wholly owned subsidiary of a government defendant);
Court Degraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (unimplicated subsidiary of a defendant parent corporation); Electric Theatre Co. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (party to a nationwide
conspiracy not included as a defendant in the prosecution of that conspiracy).
18. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
19. Principal case at 53-54.
20. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
316-21 (1965); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965).
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struction." 21 Those opinions which did rely to some degree on the
theory of incorporation also suggested that their decisions could
have rested independently on the alternative grounds of logic or
public policy. 22
On the other hand, some support can be found, both in a literal
reading of section 5(b) and in an examination of its underlying
policy considerations, for a broader interpretation of the section
than that which is found in the earlier cases or which can be inferred
from congressional inaction in the face of those decisions. First,
section 5(b) contains no specific language which would indicate a
"party scope" limitation; in fact, if read literally, the statute is to
be tolled as to every private right of action that is based in whole
or in part on a related government proceeding. 23 Second, since
private damage claims constitute an important branch of antitrust
enforcement,24 Congress has eased the evidentiary burden on private
plaintiffs by providing them with access to the fruits of prior government investigation and litigation. Specifically, the private plaintiff
21. Charles Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 154 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.
Minn. 1957), afj'd, 289 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1961); see Momand v. Universal Film Exch.,
Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Court Degraw
Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
22. E.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1954).
23. Although an interpretation of this kind is logical, congressional inaction militates against such a literal reading and, in fact, argues for a "party scope" limitation
which is satisfied only when tolling is restricted to former government defendants.
Because Congress has been silent as to the intended "party scope" of § 5(b), it has
devolved upon the judiciary to determine how this section should be applied. Concluding that neither logic nor public policy considerations would permit tolling of the
statute of limitations on claims against all private defendants without regard to
whether they had been defendants in the prior government litigation, the courts
restricted the application of § 5(b) to former government defendants. See, e.g., Momand
v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 172 F.2d 37, 48 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
967 (1949). Prior to 1955 when Congress amended § 5(b), all courts faced with the
"party scope" question had interpreted the provision in this manner. And although
the 1955 amendments revised certain sections of the Clayton Act in response to judicial interpretations-§ 4A of the amended act authorizes damage suits instituted by
the United States contrary to the opinion expressed in United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S.
600 (1941)-Congress did not alter § 5(b). A compelling inference to be drawn from
this silence is that Congress concurred with the settled judicial construction which
limits application of the tolling provision to former government defendants. And
indeed, all decisions subsequent to the 1955 revision, with the exception of the principal case, have adhered to the "government defendant limitation." See, e.g., Court
Degraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
24. See Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 131 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), quoted in note
2 supra. The "entire provision [was] intended to help persons of small means who are
injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the
antitrust laws." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). In fixing the amount
of redress at three times the value of the actual injury sustained, Congress intended
not only to create a convincing deterrent to potential antitrust violators, but also to
provide an incentive for private prosecution, thereby enlisting an auxiliary force
of investigators to supplement the Justice Department's enforcement of the antitrust
laws. Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1940).
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receives the following benefits: prima fade effect is given to final
judgments entered against government defendants; 25 rulings on
25. The principles of coIIateral estoppel limit such effect to those government
defendants against whom the judgments were entered. Section 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964) provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shaII be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section
15a of this title, as to aII matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall
not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
In the principal case, however, the court held that a government judgment and
the findings upon which it is based may be considered in determining the prima fade
effect which is to be given a consent decree previously entered in the litigation by an
alleged co-conspirator and government defendant. Principal case at 61 (supplemental
decision). International, Morton and Diamond were named as government defendants,
and although International entered into a consent decree prior to judgment against
Morton and Diamond, the court reasoned that the consent decree was nonetheless entitled to prima fade effect against International because the actual taking of testimony
used in the proceeding occurred before the consent decree was entered. More specifically, the civil proceeding from which the consent decree and judgment resulted
relied primarily on a record established in a prior criminal prosecution of the same
three defendants which terminated with a verdict in their favor. Therefore, while the
civil consent decree arguably was entered prior to the submission of testimony (though
the decree and Morton and Diamond's stipulation as to use of the criminal record were
filed on the same date), the decree was entered after the taking of the testimony in
the criminal case upon which the civil judgment was subsequently based.
In defense, International contended unsuccessfully that as to it neither the consent
decree nor the judgment used to interpret the prima facie effect to be given the decree
satisfied the conditions requisite to prima facie effect as provided for in § 5(a): that
neither the decree nor the judgment constituted a finding of an antitrust violation,
and that as to the allegations of the complaint, International had not had its day
in court.
In response to the latter contention, the court stated that since the indictment and
the complaint were virtually identical, International had received the opportunity to
litigate required by due process in the application of the principles of collateral estoppel.
As to the former ground of objection, it emphasized that, although International was
neither a party to nor specifically mentioned in the judgment, the findings of fact
upon which the judgment was based did make reference to "an illegal conspiracy
between Morton and Diamond, and other conspirators." The court then considered
these findings in connection with the contents of the criminal record, the complaint
and the civil consent decree, and drew the inference that "others" included International. In the court's opinion this inference was sufficient to justify giving the consent decree prima facie effect with respect to International's participation in the
conspiracy found illegal in the judgment against Morton and Diamond. Finally, the
court argued that the purpose of exempting consent decrees entered before the taking
of testimony-to save government the time and expense of a protracted trial-would
not be satisfied by exempting the consent decree in the instant case since the government had already had to prove its allegations in the criminal prosecution. It therefore
concluded that such an exemption would be contrary to congressional policy.
The conclusion of prima facie effect as to International is subject to question for
several reasons. In the first place, the testimony which the court treated as taken
before the entry of the civil consent decree was not taken in that proceeding, but rather
in the prior criminal prosecution which resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Of course, heretofore it has always been assumed that the testimony must not only
have been taken prior to the consent decree, but also in the same proceeding in which
the decree or judgment occurs. Secondly, the court's decision fails to take account of
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controlling points of law made during the government proceedings
are available to him as authority; and he has access to the pleadings,
transcripts, and exhibits of the government litigation as sources of
evidence.26 In fact, as enunciated in Minnesota Mining and Leh,27
the policy underlying section 5(b) is to enable private litigants to
take advantage of any and all benefits that they might derive from
the government litigation. It is arguable that if the tolling provision
is not applicable in private suits against non-government defendants,
private plaintiffs in many instances would not be able to take advantage of the information garnered in related government proceedings, since the time span between the alleged antitrust violation
and the termination of the subsequent government investigation
and litigation is often longer than the four-year statute of limitations.28 It was basically for this reason that the court in the principal
case considered it necessary to apply the tolling provision to nongovernment defendants.29
Clearly, the court's holding will result in the increased use by
private plaintiffs of materials derived from prior government proceedings. Upon closer examination, however, it seems that the apthe fact that International agreed to the consent decree on the assumption that it
was being entered before the taking of testimony and that therefore neither the decree

nor any subsequent judgment would have prima facie effect as to it in a later treble
damage action. Thirdly, International did not stipulate as to use of the criminal
record in the civil proceeding; thus it is doubtful if, as to it, there was ever any testimony submitted or taken in the civil proceeding. And lastly, the court was unwarranted in assuming that the government did not save time and expense as a result of
International's civil consent decree. On the contrary, had International remained in
the proceeding it is possible that it would have forced the government to a full proof
of all of its allegations.
On this general issue compare Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., llO F. Supp.
398 (D. Minn. 1952), appeal dismissed, 207 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1953) (consent decrees
entered before the taking of testimony on remand are prima facie evidence as to the
consenting party since a remand is in effect but a continuation of the first trial), with
Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940) (a plea
of nolo contendere entered in a new trial before the taking of testimony is exempt
from the provisions of § 5(a) since a new trial proceeds as if none had ever gone before).
26. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 3ll
(1965). In addition to the increase in evidentiary benefits, private litigants will benefit
from their ability to consolidate their damage claims and thus avoid the expenses
involved in multiple litigation. It should be noted, however, that in any event the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure would permit a plaintiff to move for a continuation
and a consolidated trial once he has instituted a lawsuit against each defendant. FED.
R. CIV. P. 18(a).
27. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. llll,
317 (1965); Leh v. General Petroleum, 382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965).
28. In fact, "there are many instances where the statute of limitations as to a
private cause of action may nearly have expired before suit is instituted by the Government under the antitrust laws." H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1955);
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
29. Principal case at 56. For a decision in which a court e.xpressly adopted the contrary position, see Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
!954).
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parent benefits to private plaintiffs resulting from the decision are
to some degree illusory.30 Damage awards in private antitrust suits
dealing with conspiratorial violations are jointly and severally recoverable.81 Moreover, the acts of a non-government defendant conspirator may be charged against a government defendant coconspirator without joining the former in the private suit against
the latter.82 As a result, private plaintiffs need not sue each and every
conspirator in order to get a full recovery. In fact, plaintiffs usually
seek recovery only from the most financially responsible members of
the conspiracy, who tend to be the principal conspirators. Since the
government also usually focuses on the most active violators, private
treble damage actions are in many instances brought against former
government defendants. Thus, the holding in the principal case
will be of practical value to private plaintiffs only in cases in which
the government defendants are not financially responsible or in
which the private plaintiff cannot bring suit against the government
defendants because of his inability to establish the requisite conspiratorial relationship between them and the non-government defendants that caused his injury.33
Moreover, whatever advantages actually accrue to private plaintiffs are at the cost of a conflict with the purposes of the statute of
limitations, which seeks to provide a definite and reasonable time
span for the litigation of claims in order to reduce the element of
surprise, to insure a good state of evidence, and to discourage delay
in the filing of actions. 34 The principal decision, by broadening the
coverage of the Clayton Act's tolling provision,35 will, of course,
30. On the other hand, the advantage heretofore enjoyed by non-government
defendants as a result of the "party scope" restriction would appear to be both actual
and substantial. In the first place, their potential liability to injured parties is limited
to the normally shorter and certainly more definite four-year statute of limitations.
Secondly, the running of the statute confers a total immunity since no right of contribution appears to exist between them and any co-conspirator government defendants subsequently found liable for treble damages to a private plaintiff. See generally
18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 33 (1965). Were such a right to exist, the benefit gained
from immunity to tolling might be offset by liability for contribution.
31. Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284, 293 (7th Cir.
1954); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
afj'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
32. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943);
Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962); Riss & Co. v.
Association of Am. R.Rs., 187 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960).
33. This possibility was recognized by the Eighth Circuit in its affirmance of the
principal decision. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1967).
34. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944); S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
35. Dictum in the principal opinion suggests that the statute of limitations may be
tolled against "a private defendant notwithstanding the fact that he was neither a
party to nor a named conspirator in the Government action." Principal case at 54. The
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result in increased litigation of stale and tenuous claims, and consequently in increased reliance on time-tainted evidence at trial.
Another undesirable consequence of the court's decision is its inhibiting effect on sound business planning. When a company becomes aware of a government prosecution involving its business
associates, it is faced with a great uncertainty because of its own
potential involvement in subsequent private litigation. Since the
principal case extends this uncertainty over an indefinite period
of time, the company might find its business position extremely
difficult to evaluate, and thus might well be inhibited in making
financial plans. Even a company that has actually been involved in
a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws has a right to be free
of stale claims and possible liability after a reasonable period.36
Once the court in the principal case decided that the "party
scope" requirement was properly satisfied, it was still faced with
the problem of determining when tolling commenced and when it
ceased.37 Plaintiffs' contention that the initiation of a grand jury
proceeding starts the tolling3 8 was rejected on the language of section 5(b) which requires that the government proceedings be for
the purpose of preventing, restraining or punishing violations.30
Although hearings before grand juries are preliminary criminal
proceedings which, in the case of federal crimes, are instituted by
the United States, their investigatorial and inquisitorial functions
place them outside the statutory definition. Moreover, apart from
this statutory argument, the congressional policy of aiding private
plaintiffs by making the products of government proceedings available to them would not be furthered by the ruling for which plaintiffs contended. Grand juries decline to return an indictment in a
Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois,
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,104, at 83,965 (8th Cir. May 22, 1967).
36. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944).
37. The determination of this time span is important for two reasons. In the first
place, all claims originating more than four years prior to commencement of the tolling
are barred by the statute, but those arising within four years thereof are sustained
by the tolling until one year after termination of government proceedings. Secondly,
the date upon which the tolling terminates fixes the point from which the additional
one-year period begins to run. See § 5(b), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) (1964), quoted in note 7 supra.
38. Brief for the State of Michigan, p. 18, principal case. Plaintiff argued that a
grand jury proceeding is a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of § 5(b) on the
grounds that grand jury proceedings are an integral phase of criminal prosecution,
that these proceedings are analogous in nature to FTC hearings which have been held
to toll the statute, and that for other purposes grand jury proceedings have been
classified as "judicial proceedings." Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
39. Section 5(b), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), quoted
in note 7 supra. See also Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 714,
718-19 (7th Cir. 1956).
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high percentage of cases,40 and even when one is returned, the
secrecy required often blocks the flow of beneficial information to
the plaintiff. It would appear, therefore, that the court in the principal case was correct in concluding on the facts before it that the
first government proceeding falling within the ambit of section 5(b)
was the filing of a criminal indictment.41
The court, having decided the commencement question, then
moved to the issue of when the tolling of the statute of limitations
should cease. Rejecting the argument that the tolling terminated
on a defendant-by-defendant basis as the government litigation
against each of them was concluded with the entry of consent decrees,42 it held that tolling continued as to all parties until the government litigation against the last remaining government defendant
had ceased.43 In so doing, the court relied on substantially the same
rationale that it had rested on in deciding the issue of tolling as to
non-government defendants.44 It reasoned that since the government litigation might result in evidence and rulings of law applicable to defendants who had previously been released through
consent decrees, the private plaintiffs would lose some of the benefit
of such evidence and rulings if the running of the statute of limitations were to resume as to these defendants upon their withdrawal
from the government litigation.45
In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly dismissed the
legislative history of section 5(b) as inconclusive and subsequent
judicial interpretation of the section as obsolete.46 The cases construing section 5(b) prior to congressional amendment of the
Clayton Act in 1955 regarded the tolling as terminating on a defendant-by-defendant basis,47 and Congress made no changes in the
40. The first two grand juries in the principal government litigation adjourned
without returning an indictment.
41. The criminal indictment was returned on June 28, 1961.
42. Carey and International maintained that the government actions against them
terminated upon the entry of their respective consent decrees. In support of their contention, they cited the following cases which hold that a government action terminates at
different times for different defendants: Grengs v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
232 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO
Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954) (expressly rejecting the conclusion that
the pendency of the government proceeding continues against all the defendants as
long as it endures against any); Tague v. Balaban, 146 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ill. 1956);
Manny v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 116 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Electric Theatre
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
43. Principal case at 50.
44. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
45. The principal case would be an instance in point if one accepts the rationale
of the supplemental opinion. See note 25 supra. See also Leh v. General Petroleum,
382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318-320 (1965).
46. Principal case at 47-49.
47. Sec cases cited note 42 supra. These decisions hold that since the purpose of
§ 5(b) is to assure the availability of the evidentiary benefits conferred by § 5(a), once
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act to alter this interpretation. As suggested in connection with the
"party scope" question, congressional acquiesence could reasonably
be inferred from this inaction.48 However, doubt may be cast upon
the significance of this legislative history. Among the several proposed amendments submitted by the Attorney General's National
Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws was a recommendation to
Congress that the tolling of the statute of limitations under section
5(b) terminate with respect to a particular defendant upon a plea of
nolo contendere or the entry of a consent;_ decree by him. 49 Congress
declined to act on this recommendation although it did enact several of the accompanying proposals. Thus, given the policy considerations which support its decision, the court was on reasonably
firm footing on the termination question.
However, there is a countervailing policy consideration: the
court's decision may result in a weakening of the incentive for a
government antitrust defendant to enter into a consent decree. The
consent decree is a valuable procedural device. 50 The parties, as
well as the public, benefit from the time and expense saved by
avoiding a prolonged trial. The ability to avoid a long tolling of
the statute of limitations is an added incentive for a government
defendant to enter such a decree. This added incentive will not be
present, however, if, when a defendant enters a consent decree, the
statute continues to toll against him until the conclusion of the
government's actions against his co-conspirators. On the other hand,
since the remaining financial inducements to enter into such decrees are considerable, any overall decline in incentive might merely
be marginal.
The principal case represents a substantial deviation from prior
judicial construction of the tolling provision. Although the court
appears to have decided correctly the issues of commencement and
a judgment or decree is available against a particular defendant as prima facie evidence the rationale for considering a government prosecution as pending against that
defendant ceases to exist. The crux of the cases is their assumption that protection
of § 5(a) is the exclusive purpose of the tolling provision. If, however, the purpose of
§ 5(b) is really more comprehensive-and Leh and Minnesota Mining appear to stand
for this proposition-this aspect of the rationale of these decisions would appear to be
destroyed.
The force of the authority cited by defendants is weakened further by the fact
that the cases are all district or circuit court decisions arising out of the same government prosecution and are interdependent in their holdings. Thus the precedent is not
as comprehensive and persuasive as the number of cases would seem to indicate. See
Reply Memorandum of Illinois and Indiana Plaintiffs, pp. 3-4, principal case.
48. See note 23 supra.
49. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITI'EE To STUDY THE ANTI·
TRUST LAws, Recommendation 2C (1955).
50. Congress took cognizance of this fact when it exempted consent decrees entered
before the taking of testimony from the prima facie effect given to judgments under
§ 5(a). See § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), quoted in
note 25 supra.
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termination, on the basic question of "party scope" it failed to
recognize considerations which might well have required it to reach
the opposite result. It is to be hoped that this will not be the final
word; future courts faced with the same problem should weigh
more carefully the practical consequences of the alternative decisions before deciding where to strike the balance.

